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COMMENTS
In Search of a Cause: Addressing the
Confusion in Proving Causation
of a Public Nuisance
STEVEN SARNO*
On February 22, 2006, a Rhode Island jury** found defendant
lead paint manufacturers1 liable for the costs of abating the lead
health hazard that their products had created in the state’s hous-
ing stock.2  This marked the first time that an American jury
found lead paint manufacturers liable under a public nuisance
theory.  This group of defendants previously had been sued in sev-
eral states by both private plaintiffs and governmental entities.
Virtually all of these claims failed.3  Against the backdrop of the
Rhode Island case, this paper examines the recent decisions from
other state courts wrestling with the application of public nui-
sance doctrine to the lingering lead-paint contamination in our
national housing.
This paper works from the premise, as articulated in the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, that public nuisance is a viable and
flexible tool available to state entities in the exercise of their du-
* Steven Sarno is a 2009 J.D./M.S.E.P. joint-degree candidate attending Pace
Law School and Bard College Center for Environmental Policy.  He would like to
thank his masterful editors, Alex Howard and Lauren Stabile, for their tireless assis-
tance and recognize his supportive family – they are, after all, the whole point.
** Author’s note: Since the writing of this paper, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court decided the appeal by lead paint manufacturers, reversing the trial court’s de-
nial of defendants’ motion to dismiss.  A brief analysis of this decision and its impact
on the reasoning in this article is discussed in the addendum.
1. As used in this paper, the term “lead paint manufacturers” includes manufac-
turers and distributors of lead-based paint and lead pigment, successors-in-interest to
such manufacturers and distributors, trade associations for both the paint and lead
industries, and lead extraction and processing companies.
2. See Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. 99-5226, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS
32, at *1 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007) (decision on post-trial motions, filed February 26,
2007, discussing the unanimous jury verdict for the state).
3. See notes infra 7, 56 & 59; discussion infra part IIB.
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ties to protect the public health, safety, welfare, and comfort.4  In
many of the lead paint lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs, as
well as by governments not alleging public nuisance, plaintiffs
sought damages and restitution for the costs of treating lead
poisoned individuals.  Lead paint manufacturers successfully de-
fended against these claims by making a two-part argument: (1)
plaintiffs failed to show product identification5 (and thus could not
prove a causal link to the defendants), and (2) alternative liability
theories, such as market share liability, do not apply to lead paint
(and thus could not relieve a plaintiff from the burden of causa-
tion).6  On the whole, courts accepted this argument.7  Capitaliz-
ing on the success of these arguments, defendant manufacturers
reasserted them in subsequent lawsuits brought by state entities
alleging public nuisance.  The court in Rhode Island found these
arguments inapposite and the jury subsequently found the de-
fendants liable for abatement.  Other courts, however, have not
been as careful in their review of public nuisance law and have
prematurely or erroneously rejected the theory as it applies to
lead paint.
Recent decisions dealing with claims brought by state entities
against lead paint manufacturers suggest a certain amount of ju-
dicial confusion.  This confusion is understandable, but cannot be
acceptable.  Several factors combine to create this confusion, chief
among them, and the focus of this paper, is: the misapplication of
a negligence causation standard to states’ public nuisance claims.
Unlike negligence actions, which focus on the causation of injury
to an individual and a defendant’s liability for it, public nuisance
4. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (1979); see also
infra notes 68, 84 & 121.
5. This argument, often called the “product identification requirement,” stems
from the notion that any claim based on negligence requires plaintiffs to identify par-
ticular product made by a particular defendant-manufacturer at a particular location
that caused injury to a particular individual. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Benjamin
Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 115 (Mo. 2007) (citing Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676
S.W.2d 241, 247 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (“[s]trict liability in tort continues to provide a
remedy to those plaintiffs who satisfy the identification requirement.”).
6. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 02-CH_16212, 2003
WL 23315567, *1 -*3 (Ill. Cir. Oct. 7, 2003) (noting both that market share liability
could not be applied to lead paint in Illinois and City’s failure to demonstrate product
identification was fatal to its public nuisance claim).
7. See, e.g., Spring Branch Indep. School Dist. v. NL Indus., No. 01-02-01006-CV,
2004 WL 1404036 (Tex. App. June 24, 2004) (holding that plaintiff’s failure to produce
direct evidence of product identification and the inapplicability of alternative liability
to lead paint hazards justified the dismissal of plaintiff’s product liability action
against lead paint manufacturers).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/6
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actions are concerned only with the causation of the nuisance it-
self.8  In order to see clearly why some courts have mistakenly
blended these issues, and why public nuisance is a viable theory
for state entities pursuing lead paint abatement, we must briefly
examine the legal journey that lead paint has taken through the
American judiciary.
Part I lays out the factual foundation of lead paint hazard
lawsuits and identifies the attributes particular to lead and lead-
based paint that become dispositive issues in each type of action
(whether products liability, nuisance, conspiracy, etc.).  This sec-
tion recounts the emergence of lead poisoning as a public health
concern, the rise of government regulation, and the failure of state
programs to eliminate adequately enduring lead hazards.
Part II describes the kinds of claims brought against lead
paint manufacturers in the context of this country’s early toxic
products litigation.  Here, causation, and the role it plays in negli-
gence actions,9 can be teased out from the ultimate disposition of
the suits.  By way of illustration, this section also compares the
relevant facets of the initial lead paint cases to asbestos litigation
involving public nuisance claims.  Here, the relative merits of al-
ternative liability theories, and their inapplicability to lead paint,
are explained.
Part III considers five recent lead paint cases, each of which
features a government entity’s attempt to use public nuisance doc-
trine to secure abatement funds from lead paint manufacturers,
and compares them to the outcome in Rhode Island.  These five
8. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 117 (Mo.
2007) (Wolff, C.J., dissenting) (noting that issues in alternative liability cases are ir-
relevant to public nuisance claims because the focus is on contribution to the problem
and not individual injury); City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 892-
93 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (drawing a critical distinction between causation of the nui-
sance, at issue, and the causation of the injury, not directly at issue).
9. This concept will be expanded upon later in this paper, but readers should
note now that “negligence actions” here refers to claims based on negligence, products
liability, and strict liability since these claims all stem from original tort principles
underpinning the Roman conception of the law of care and carrying forth, among
other elements, identical causation and damages requirements.  The tort of nuisance,
by contrast, is not rooted in the negligence tradition or any of its later reincarnations
(i.e. products liability, strict liability, alternative liability, etc.). See, e.g., Nelson P.
Miller, An Ancient Law of Care, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 3 (2004) (discussing the evolu-
tion of individual liability for intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability). See
also, Abed Awad, The Concept of Defect in American and English Products Liability
Discourse: Despite Strict Liability Linguistics, Negligence is Back with a Vengeance!,
10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 275 (1998) (observing a blurring of the distinction between
strict liability and negligence in the context of products liability).
3
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cases are: City of Chicago v. American Cyanamid Co.,10 (“Ameri-
can Cyanamid”); County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,11
(“Santa Clara”); City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc.,12 (“Milwau-
kee”); In re Lead Paint Litigation,13 (“New Jersey Consolidated
Lead”); and, City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co.,14 (“St.
Louis.”).  Half of these cases (American Cyanamid, New Jersey
Consolidated Lead, and St. Louis) have reached the end of their
judicial journey while the other half (Santa Clara, Milwaukee, and
Rhode Island)15 were still pending at the time of this writing;16
nonetheless, all inform the argument made in this paper.  Since
Rhode Island is the only example in which a jury found the de-
fendants liable, the analysis in this paper is best couched in terms
of why the state prevailed there and why other government enti-
ties have not.
In conclusion, Part IV argues that the classification of lead
paint contamination as a public nuisance is not a significant part
of the debate.  Rather, this paper argues that courts dismissing
the public nuisance claims misconstrue the causation burden that
plaintiffs must bear in arguing a public nuisance.  Unlike claims
sounding in some version of negligence, the public nuisance doc-
trine does not require product identification and to the extent that
courts blend the notion of negligence-type causation with public
nuisance-type causation, they commit error.  In closing, this sec-
tion argues that government entities bringing public nuisance ac-
tions against lead paint manufacturers must diligently reframe
the issues before the court.  Failure to clarify the requirements of
a public nuisance claim, with respect to causation, will likely al-
low defendant manufacturers to distract busy courts with inap-
propriate negligence arguments.
10. 823 N.E.2d 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
11. 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (Ct. App. 2006).
12. 691 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
13. 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007).
14. 226 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
15. Only Rhode Island and Milwaukee have reached a verdict.  In Rhode Island,
the verdict was for the plaintiff-State. See Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. 99-
5226, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32, at *1 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).  In Milwaukee, the
verdict, by a vote of 10-2, found that defendant-manufacturers were not liable for the
public nuisance. See Marie Rohde, Lead Paint Suit Fails, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
June 22, 2007, available at http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=623662.
16. Author’s note: Rhode Island has been decided since the writing of this paper.
The implications of this decision are considered in the addendum.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/6
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PART I: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEAD PAINT
Lead is a useful substance.  It powers our car batteries; it pro-
tects us from excessive x-rays; it insulates millions of miles of
cable; it is indispensable to welders as the primary source of sol-
der because of its high malleability and fusibility.17  In paint, lead
was added to increase the vibrancy of color, to reduce drying time,
and to create a durable, washable surface.  These qualities were
particularly cost-effective for hospitals, schools, and public hous-
ing (where small budgets demand function at the lowest cost), but
also appealed to the general public.  Until the federal ban in
1978,18 lead paint was sold in U.S. markets for many purposes,
including exterior and interior residential decoration, coatings on
toys and furniture, and industrial applications.  Although the
toxic qualities of lead paint were known within the industry,19 the
medical profession,20 and the government,21 lead paint went virtu-
17. See Iain Thornton, et al. Lead: The Facts, IC Consultants Ltd., London (Dec.
2001) available at http://www.ila-lead.org/factbook/chapter1.pdf.
18. The ban became effective on February 27, 1978. See Establishment as
Banned Hazardous Products, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,193, 44,199 (Sept. 1, 1977) (to be codi-
fied at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1303).
19. The Chameleon, Sherwin-Williams newsletter in 1889, noted that “It is also
familiarly known that white lead is a deadly cumulative poison . . .”  The Sherwin-
Williams Co and their Role in the Lead-Based Paint Business, Sherwin Williams: Cov-
ering Our Communities with Toxics (Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. For Reform Now, New Orle-
ans, La.), June 28, 2006, at 9 (citing The Chameleon (Sherwin-Williams, Cleveland,
Ohio), Dec., 1899). The S.W.P.,  another company newsletter, stated that, “white lead
is poisonous in a large degree, both for the workmen and for the inhabitants of a
house painted with white lead colors.” The Sherwin-Williams Co and their Role in the
Lead-Based Paint Business, Sherwin Williams: Covering Our Communities with Tox-
ics (Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. For Reform Now, New Orleans, La.), June 28, 2006, at 9
(citing The S.W.P. (Cleveland, Ohio), July, 1904).  Note: Sherwin-Williams reversed
its position after acquiring a white lead processing plant in 1910.  See The Sherwin-
Williams Co and their Role in the Lead-Based Paint Business, Sherwin Williams: Cov-
ering Our Communities with Toxics (Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. For Reform Now, New Orle-
ans, La.), June 28, 2006, at 9. In 1928, the company joined the Lead Industries
Association.  Markowitz, infra note 20.
20. Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, “Cater to the Children”: The Role of the
Lead Industry in a Public Health Tragedy, 1900-1955, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 36, 36
(2000) [hereinafter “Markowitz, Cater to the Children”] (citing M. D. Stewart, Notes
on Some Obscure Cases of Poisoning by Lead Chromate Manifested Chiefly by En-
cephalopathy, 1 MED. NEWS 676, 676-81 (1887); A. Hamilton, Industrial Diseases,
With Special Reference to the Trades in Which Women are Employed, 20 CHARITIES &
COMMONS 655, 658 (1908)).
21. Manufacture, Sales, etc., of Adulterated or Mislabeled White Lead and Mixed
Paint: Hearing on H.R. 21901 Before H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
61st Cong. (1910) (testimony of Marion E. Rhodes of Missouri speaking to the general
consensus that lead is a poison).See also G. B. Heckel, The Outlook for Paint Manufac-
turers, 34 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 69, 73
(1909) (noting that several states introduced legislation to prohibit white lead paint
5
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ally unregulated throughout the late 1800s and into the 1960s.22
While several American cultural realities contributed to this regu-
latory delay,23 the effectiveness of a proactive information cam-
paign coordinated by lead manufacturers, and later the Lead
Industries Association (LIA),24 was arguably the most important
factor in delaying regulation.25  Despite individual state efforts to
regulate lead paint, LIA and its member companies promoted lead
across the national market in order to “meet” the issue of lead
poisoning and “protect the good name of lead.”26 This proactive
effort, similar to the practices of both asbestos and tobacco trade
groups, is, of course, the normal function of trade groups.27  How-
due to its toxic properties, but were successfully opposed by the industry); Frederick
J. Schlink, What Government Does and Might Do for the Consumer, 173 Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 125, 138 (1934) (noting that gov-
ernment agencies were aware of the hazards of lead paint for indoor use but had
suppressed this information from public view).
22. Many other countries, by contrast, after recognizing the dangers of lead,
banned lead paint outright. See Markowitz, Cater to the Children, supra note 20, at
37 (by 1934 many industrialized countries had restricted the use of white lead in
paint).
23. See Christian Warren, Toxic Purity: The Progressive Era Origins of America’s
Lead Paint Poisoning Epidemic, 73 BUS. HIST. REV., 705 (1999) (exploring the inde-
pendence of Master Painters and the social acceptance of heightened health risks in
the name of industrial expansion).
24. The Lead Industries Association (LIA) was formed to prevent other metal in-
dustries, such as zinc and titanium, from replacing lead as the principal paint pig-
ment.  See Markowitz, Cater to the Children, supra note 20, at 36. The LIA functioned
as a clearinghouse for information related to lead mining, processing, manufacturing,
and sale. See id.
25. In 1923, National Lead ran advertisements in National Geographic claiming
“Lead helps to guard your health.” See David Rosner, Plumbing the Plumbing, 95 AM.
SCIENTIST 541 (2007) citing National Lead, Lead helps guard your health, NAT’L GEO-
GRAPHIC, Nov. 1923, at 44 (advertisement).  In 1949, Maryland passed a ‘toxic fin-
ishes’ law that required children’s furniture and toys finished with lead paint to be
labeled. See GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY
POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 95 (University of California Press 2002). LIA im-
mediately held several private conferences with Maryland governmental authorities
and succeeded in having the law repealed a year later. See id.  Similar attempts to
regulate lead paint were thwarted in state legislatures, including Massachusetts. See
Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., No. 99-5226, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32, at
*177-78 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).
26. Markowitz, DECEIT AND DENIAL, supra note 25, at 93-94.  For an illustrated
summary of the Gerald Markowitz’s lead advertising timeline in Cater to the Chil-
dren, visit History of Lead Advertising http://www.cincinnatichildrens.org/research/
project/enviro/hazard/lead/lead-advertising (last visited Nov. 29, 2008).
27. In several cases, however, these efforts went beyond information sharing and
advocacy, reaching levels of conspiracy sufficiently cognizable to warrant scrutiny in
several lawsuits. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000) (tobacco); Hoffman v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379, 1381 (11th Cir. 1990) (asbes-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/6
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ever, these efforts to delay regulation extended the period of mass
exposure much longer than it otherwise might have been.28
While most early studies demonstrating lead’s toxicity were
easily dismissed as inconclusive,29 over time, as the medical evi-
dence became impossible to ignore, manufacturers shifted tone
and asserted that regulation was unnecessary because lead
hazards could be neutralized by consumers.30  However, medical
experts have publicly criticized the notion that the risks of lead
exposure can be neutralized.31  In response, lead manufacturers
asserted that painters (owners or landlords) assumed the respon-
sibility and risk by painting the walls with lead paint.32  In as-
suming this risk, the manufacturers argued, the responsibility to
manage the danger lead paint posed to human health fell on the
individual consumer, not the companies that initially made the
product.33
Given that interior use of lead paint was banned in 1978, the
recent appearance of public nuisance cases might seem anachro-
nistic; however, recent municipal health investigations, in addi-
tos); In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 842 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (asbestos);
City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 895-96 (Wis. 2005) (lead paint).
28. As a practical consequence, this broad window of exposure makes market
share liability theory difficult to apply to lead paint cases. See infra notes 52 & 54.
29. The first medical study, written in English, was conducted in Australia by J.
L. Gibson, who concluded that the lead-based paint on walls and porch railings was
the source of the lead poisoning observed in his patients.  The lead industry dismissed
these findings as anomalies, calling them inconclusive. See J. Julian Chisolm, Jr., et
al., The Road to Primary Prevention of Lead Toxicity in Children, 107 PEDIATRICS 581,
n16 (2001), citing J. Lockhart Gibson, A Plea for Painted Railings and Painted Rooms
as the Source of Lead Poisoning Amongst Queensland Children, 23 AUSTL. MED GA-
ZETTE 149-53 (1904); see also Markowitz, Cater to the Children, supra note 20, at 36-
37 citing same.
30. This remains a prominent argument in public nuisance cases today where
companies point to the responsibility of landlords to maintain the habitability of their
buildings and prevent deterioration of lead paint.  See infra note 37.
31. See Transcript of Record at 28, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. 99-
5226, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Super. Ct. 2007 Feb. 26, 2007) (testimony of Dr.
James Girard, chemist and witness for the plaintiff, stating that lead paint deteriora-
tion was inevitable and efforts to neutralize the dust and chips would fail); Transcript
of Record at 124-26, Rhode Island, No. 99-5226, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Super.
Ct.) (testimony of Dr. Philip Landrigan, public health specialist and witness for the
plaintiff, noting that even intact paint presented an immediate hazard when used in
certain places (i.e. window frames, door jambs, floors, banisters, etc.)).
32. See, e.g., Brief of Defendants-Respondents at 35-36, City of Milwaukee v. NL
Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 01-CV-3066).
33. This argument, however, rings hollow in the public nuisance context because
individual injury is not the focus of the claim.  Rather, government entities seek
abatement of a nuisance that affects the public at large and so the public (through the
government representative) is the party seeking relief.
7
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tion to documenting the enduring existence of lead paint hazards
despite the ban, have begun to quantify the long-term develop-
mental effects of lead on children.34  Considering that pediatric
studies have determined that the level of lead necessary to poison
is surprisingly small,35 the quantity of lead that remains in older
houses is often sufficient to create a potential hazard, and if any
painted surface is abraded, sanded, renovated, or chewed, the po-
tential hazard becomes immediate.  Because lead affects neurolog-
ical development in children, the damage is irreversible and
symptoms of poisoning, absent screening, occur too late to allow
preventive intervention.36  Thus, unless lead is abated in advance,
eventual lead poisoning victims will be permanently injured.
To achieve complete abatement, however, is costly and gov-
ernments cannot afford simply to engage in large-scale remedia-
tion,37 nor can most tenants exposed to lead paint hazards afford
34. See, e.g., Scott Grosse, et al., Economic Gains Resulting from the Reduction in
Children’s Exposure to Lead in the United States, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 563
(2002).
35. To get a workable idea of how much lead is required to poison a child, take a
packet of sweetener, divide it into 1 million piles.  Discard 999,990 piles and place the
remaining 10 piles in a 1/5 cup of water.  This would approximate 10 micrograms per
deciliter, the current limit as set by the EPA. See U.S. EPA, ADDRESSING LEAD AT
SUPERFUND SITES, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/lead/health.htm (last visited Nov.
29, 2008).  However, recent studies have indicated that the current “safe” level is not
stringent enough to protect children from injury. See WORK GROUP OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION, A REVIEW OF EVIDENCE OF
ADVERSE HEALTH EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH BLOOD LEAD LEVELS < 10 µG/DL IN CHIL-
DREN, in CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PREVENTING LEAD POISON-
ING IN YOUNG CHILDREN (2005).
36. See Herbert L. Needleman, et al., Deficits in Psychologic and Classroom Per-
formance of Children with Elevated Dentine Lead Levels, 300 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL
OF MEDICINE 689 (1979).  While chelation therapy can lower the blood lead level of a
child, the physiological damages, once wrought, cannot be repaired by current medical
science.  See also Patrick Breysse, et al., The Relationship Between Housing and
Health: Children at Risk, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.S 1583 (2004) (noting the irre-
versibility of the neurodevelopmental effects of lead poisoning); Chisolm, supra note
29, at 581 (urging reduced reliance on chelation therapy to protect children from lead
hazards).
37. In 2001, a State Inter-Agency Task Force in New Jersey estimated that total
lead paint abatement would cost the state $50 billion. See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924
A.2d 484, 507 (N.J. 2007).  At the individual property level, the cost of abatement
($12,000) is similarly beyond the reach of many owners. See id.   In Rhode Island,
considering only the future costs of lead abatement in residential homes, the state
estimated the cost to be between $1.37 and $3.74 billion. See Rhode Island v. Lead
Indus. Ass’n, No. 99-5226, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32, at *285-86 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26,
2007).  While a municipality or state could, in theory, appropriate sufficient funds to
remove lead paint from the existing housing stock, such an exercise would ignore con-
sideration of the potential responsibility resting on the manufacturers and would
render an exploration of recent litigation purposeless.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/6
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to abate the problem themselves.  As a result, most lead poisoned
individuals sought damages from landlords, whether private or
state-owned.38  This individualized model for remediation cannot
solve the problem of lead paint hazards because private plaintiffs
are limited in their recovery by statutes of limitations, judgment-
proof defendant-landlords, the inefficiency of this piecemeal ap-
proach, and, in some cases, statutory protections for the landlords
themselves.39  Even for private plaintiffs who do not face these ad-
ditional, practical obstacles, there are several legal principles that
will get in the way.
PART II: WHY GOVERNMENTS ARE BEST SUITED
TO SEEK REMEDIES FOR LEAD PAINT
CONTAMINATION AND WHY NEGLIGENCE-
TYPE CLAIMS WILL FAIL
A: Finding a Claim
Lead paint is not the first mass product from which individu-
als and governments have sought relief from the original manu-
facturers; nor is public nuisance the first theory to be asserted in
lead paint cases.  Rather, plaintiffs often started (and many con-
tinue to assert) claims sounding in negligence or its offshoots.40
Negligence, the most basic tort claim, has expanded and given rise
to related theories such as strict liability and products liability.41
What began as a theory applied especially to protect consumers
from tainted foods and beverages,42 has evolved into the settled
theory of strict liability, employed to do justice, as conceived by
38. See, e.g., Gould v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 595 So. 2d 1238 (La. Ct. App.
1992) (suing a public housing authority for damages based on lead poisoning); Scrog-
gins v. Dahne, 645 A.2d 1160 (Md. 1994) (suing private landlord for injuries caused by
lead paint ingestion).
39. Donald Gifford & Paolo Pasicolan, Market-share Liability Beyond DES Cases:
The Solution to the Causation Dilemma in Lead Paint Cases?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 115, 127
(2006).  Professor Gifford notes in a 2005 article that in the Washington Metro region,
plaintiffs have not been unsuccessful in their claims against landlords when the land-
lords can afford to pay. See Donald Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent
Diseases Resulting from Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REV. 613, 626 (2005).
40. See Edmund J. Ferdinand, III, Asbestos Revisited: Lead-Based Paint Toxic
Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 581, 595 (1992) (discussing the initia-
tion of suits against lead paint manufacturers in the late 1980s).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (treating strict liability as
a special form of liability, under negligence, for a seller of a product causing harm to
the user).
42. See id. (Reporter’s Notes, Section 1, gathering cases from the 1930s through
the 1960s).
9
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the judiciary and applied to a host of different products.43  Individ-
uals in such cases, injured by defective products, can recover from
the particular manufacturer by proving defective design or failure
to warn.  Once a defect or failure to warn is proven, plaintiffs then
bear the same causation and injury burden that a plaintiff would
be required to bear in a pure negligence case.44  Meaning, plain-
tiffs must prove “not only that the actor’s conduct [was] negligent
toward the other, but also that the negligence of the actor [was] a
legal cause of the other’s harm.”45  This, as we will see, presents
evidentiary difficulties (namely product identification) for people
injured by lead paint and ultimately makes negligence-type theo-
ries a poor choice for resolving the problem.
For tenants living in housing that contains lead paint, identi-
fying the manufacturer of the paint on the walls is an evidentiary
nightmare.  Because a housing structure inevitably outlasts its
paint job, multiple coats of different paint are applied and re-
moved over the course of time.  Similarly, ownership of the hous-
ing structure will often change hands many times over the
decades just as manufacturers will alter paint formulations many
times over the life of the product line, further muddying a particu-
lar house’s paint history.  Getting provable facts to line up in favor
of a lead poisoned plaintiff, such that the injury to the individual
can be traced to a particular exposure of a particular manufac-
turer’s lead paint product, becomes virtually impossible.  Proving
this negligence-type causal link (essentially product identifica-
tion) in cases where the injury from a product is not readily trace-
able to a particular manufacturer was a legal impossibility until
the asbestos cases in the 1970s, in which courts began to recognize
the liability of multiple possible defendants for individual injuries
involving delayed or latent diseases.46
The first instance in which an individual, exposed to multiple
sources of asbestos, successfully recovered damages against a
43. See, e.g., McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn.1960)
(insecticides); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (en
banc) (power tools); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)
(automobiles).
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(c) (1965) (relevant here is the fact
that the same causation burden is common to all negligence-type claims).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965).
46. See Pamela A. Meyer et al., Global Approach to Reducing Lead Exposure and
Poisoning, 659 MUTATION RES. 166, 167 (2008) (discussing the range of adverse health
effects of lead poisoning, and the higher vulnerability of children to long-term impair-
ment of cognitive and behavioral development).
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manufacturer of insulation containing asbestos materials, Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,47 sparked a flood of subsequent
lawsuits.48  The Borel court, in discussing the complications for
multiple exposure victims observed:
In the instant case, it is impossible, as a practical matter, to
determine with absolute certainty which particular exposure to
asbestos dust resulted in injury to Borel. It is undisputed, how-
ever, that Borel contracted asbestosis from inhaling asbestos
dust and that he was exposed to the products of all the defend-
ants on many occasions. It was also established that the effect of
exposure to asbestos dust is cumulative, that is, each exposure
may result in an additional and separate injury. We think,
therefore, that on the basis of strong circumstantial evidence
the jury could find that each defendant was the cause in fact of
some injury to Borel.49
The physical similarities between toxic lead paint and toxic asbes-
tos would seem to suggest that the reasoning in asbestos cases
would bolster lead paint claims.50  However, the success of the
plaintiff in Borel does not readily translate to lead poisoned plain-
tiffs or the governments that represent them.  Unlike asbestos
cases, where individuals are exposed to multiple products from
identifiable manufacturers, lead poisoned individuals are exposed
to multiple products from unidentifiable manufacturers.51  Thus,
47. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
48. As of 2005, individuals injured by asbestos had filed over 600,000 claims. See
Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resulting From
Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REV. 613, 620 (2005).
49. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1094.
50. Indeed, as the dissent in New Jersey Consolidated Lead remarked: “There is
no meaningful difference between the manufacturing of asbestos and the production
of toxic lead pigment.” In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 509 (Zazzali, C.J.
dissenting).
51. Lead paint cannot be traced to a particular source through any scientific test-
ing process because the operative toxin in lead paint is uniform and has no identifi-
able chemical attributes.  The court in Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., No. 12596/93,
1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 440, at *4 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1999), found that all white lead
pigment is identical in its chemical structure. See also Amicus Brief of National
Paints & Coating Association in Support of Respondents, City of St. Louis v. Benja-
min Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2007) (No. SC88230) (asserting the impossibil-
ity of determining the source of a particular paint formula because they were
historically kept secret); Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 691 N.W.2d 888, 893 (acknowledg-
ing the impossibility of identifying specific paint in particular houses); Brief of De-
fendants-Respondents at 53, City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888,
(Wis. Ct. App.  2004) (No. 03-2786) (also arguing that the city cannot demonstrate
sufficient facts to warrant the inference that each defendant’s paint is present at par-
ticular locations).
11
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the harm caused to a particular individual by lead paint cannot be
attributed to a particular manufacturer, except in highly unlikely
circumstances.52  As a result, plaintiffs cannot make the requisite
product identification to satisfy the negligence-type causation
standard.  This makes reliance on negligence-type claims unwise
for lead poisoned individuals, as well as government entities since
the injury from the product will still be measured at the individ-
ual/citizen level and thus will require a similar showing of
causation.
B: Looking Beyond Negligence
The causation problem that lead paint plaintiffs face in strict
liability cases is the same limitation faced by daughters whose
mothers took DES and that led to the creation of market-share
liability theory, developed in the landmark California case Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories.53  There, plaintiffs were allowed to use
data demonstrating the individual market share for each defen-
dant-drug company in order to determine the allocation of liability
for damages.  Based on public policy reasons, the court decided
that the normal causation requirements should not apply.54  For
lead-poisoned plaintiffs facing causation proof problems, market-
share liability theory, a special kind of alternative liability,55
52. Such circumstances would require a child to be born and raised in a single
home, the paint in which came from a single batch of proprietary paint and that paint
can, by unshakable testimony, be traced from the wall to the can to the retailer and
back to the manufacturer.  Such instances are exceedingly rare, but can happen. See
Pollard v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 955 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 2007) (reversing dismissal and
remanding claim for trial where testimony of a minister and others demonstrated
that defendant’s lead paint had been applied from time of construction in the 1930s
through the 1978 ban on lead paint).
53. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).  The Court in Sindell authored the first decision that
excused injured plaintiffs from establishing which defendant’s product actually
caused their injuries, allowing them instead to rely on market-share data to allocate
liability.  This doctrine allowed courts, in jurisdictions where it was adopted, to craft
fair solutions in cases where (1) defendants’ conduct was tortious, (2) plaintiffs suf-
fered serious injuries as a result, and (3) the only obstacle to relief is an inability to
match each injury to a particular defendant. See id.  The Court reasoned: “as between
an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the
injury.” Id. at 936.
54. The court reasoned that the particular facts of the case allowed the market-
share theory to be applied fairly.  Specifically, the court found that the product in
question was fungible (identical and easily substituted), the exposure window was
narrow (nine months in utero), and the resulting rare form of cancer was a signature
injury that was not likely caused by another source. Id. at 924, 926.
55. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948) (defining alternative liability
as a theory that shifts the causation in fact burden to defendants once innocent plain-
tiff proves tortious conduct by a single, unidentifiable defendant).  For an example of
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/6
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would seem an excellent alternative and, in fact, many plaintiffs
have asserted it.56  However, most courts have refused to extend
this alternative liability theory to lead paint.  The decision by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Skipworth v. Lead Industries
Association57 is representative of those jurisdictions refusing to
add lead paint to the short list of products that meet the require-
ments for the market-share liability theory.58  Confusion arises,
however, because the Sindell-Skipworth line of cases, as well as
those rejecting claims that appear to rely on Sindell, focus judicial
attention on causation without emphasizing the further distinc-
tion between causation of the injury and causation of the haz-
ard.59  The former is the basis for arguments for defendant-lead
paint manufacturers,60 while the latter is the actual issue in pub-
lic nuisance cases.61  It is telling that government plaintiffs in
Santa Clara and Milwaukee suing in the two states most accom-
enterprise liability, recall the seminal case Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), where a federal court found that the sparsely popu-
lated blasting caps industry could be held collectively liable for the injuries their prod-
ucts caused to children because the industry had adhered to a common safety
standard, which was insufficient to protect the children.
56. See, e.g., Jackson v. Glidden Co., 647 N.E.2d 879 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (indi-
vidual plaintiff claimed manufacturers were liable in enterprise liability, alternative
liability, and market-share liability); City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 994
F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993) (city alleged manufacturers were liable in alternative liability,
enterprise liability, and market-share liability).
57. 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997).
58. Courts, such as the one in Skipworth, tend to reject market-share theory for
two reasons.  First, unlike the chemical compound in Sindell, courts tend to find that
lead pigment is not fungible.  Rather, it has many chemical formulations that create
differing levels of toxicity.  This conclusion, while the majority rule, has not been uni-
versal. See supra note 38.  Aside from fungibility, the Skipworth court also found that
the relevant time period for market activity (spanning eight decades) and the time
period for exposure to the lead paint (a period of years – often ages 0-6) were too broad
to allow for any precision that would fairly apportion liability among the lead paint
manufacturers operating over the course of many decades. See Skipworth, 690 A.2d
at 234.
59. See, e.g., Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. NL Indus., Inc., No. 01-02-01006-
CV, 2004 WL 1404036, at *3-*4 (Tex. App. June 24, 2004) (after finding no direct
evidence of product identification, turning immediately to the jurisdiction’s earlier
rejection of market-share liability theory); Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d
126, 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (mistakenly treating the public nuisance and products
liability claims as having identical causation requirements).
60. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Mo.
2007) (en banc) (discussing the application of legal causation requirement as it is con-
ceived of in negligence claims to the plaintiff’s public nuisance claim).
61. Whether defendant-manufacturers assert these arguments with the intention
of distracting the court or whether they are simply genuinely mistaken is irrelevant
to the extent that the court itself articulates the ultimate decision and intention by
the parties does not carry over into the opinion.
13
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modating to market-share liability theory chose not to pursue
such a claim, suggesting that parties familiar with market-share
liability theory understand that it is not in conflict with public
nuisance nor are the facts sought to be proven in support of a pub-
lic nuisance dependent on the acceptance of market-share liability
theory.62
Beyond negligence, but still well within the realm of tort law,
lies nuisance.  Nuisance is admittedly a difficult concept to de-
fine,63 and the very murkiness of the concept contributes to its
misinterpretation.  Because public nuisance is a common law prin-
ciple inherited from English law, it has become ensconced in
American tort law and its existence is generally not questioned.
However, its status as a common law principle also leads to state-
specific jurisprudence and codification that makes minor altera-
tions to its specific attributes.  Courts divide nuisance into two
types: public and private.  A private nuisance is defined in the Re-
statement as “a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in
the private use and enjoyment of land.”64  Logically, lead paint,
once applied to the walls of a house located on land, could affect
the enjoyment of that land without amounting to a trespass when
it becomes abraded or deteriorated through normal use, thus cre-
ating a health risk to family members.65  However, like negli-
gence-type claims, private nuisance claims also require a form of
product identification at the property-specific level because the in-
jury is measured by the impact on the use and enjoyment of land
not on the type of conduct involved.66  Private plaintiffs are thus
unable to make much headway under this theory.67  Public nui-
62. Neither the Santa Clara court, nor the Milwaukee court addressed the mar-
ket-share theory whether as an alternative, a fall back position, or a preferred ave-
nue. See County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (Ct. App.
2006); City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
63. See City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d at 130, 130 n.2 (quoting
the Illinois Supreme Court’s dissatisfied observation that “[t]here is perhaps no more
impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word ‘nuisance’”)
(internal citations omitted). See also In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 494 (N.J.
2007).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979).
65. See id. cmt. a (noting that the nature of the interest includes harm to mem-
bers of the family and to chattel).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. b (1979) (noting that the
“[f]ailure to recognize that private nuisance has reference to the interest invaded and
not the type of conduct that subjects the actor to liability has led to confusion”).
67. Private nuisance would also limit government entities to bringing actions
based solely on properties it owns. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D(a)
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/6
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sance, then, remains the only viable claim to deal efficiently with
widespread lead hazards.
Public nuisance is different.  Public nuisance is generally de-
fined as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public.”68  To satisfy this definition, the plaintiff’s burden
can be broken down as requiring proof:
1. of the existence of a public right,
2. that the right has been interfered with,
3. that the interference was unreasonable, and
4. that the plaintiff has a right to bring the action.
Whether the interference is with a public right is not a strict
‘population affected’ test, but rather must be a right that is public
in nature.69  For example, toxic waste dumped into a stream may
affect dozens of downstream riparian owners, but an interference
with waterfront property does not affect a public right.  If the toxic
waste killed fish and forced the public beach to close, however,
then a public right has been affected.70  In the case of lead paint,
the elimination of private rights of action to remediate lead paint
hazards has shouldered the government with the cost of investi-
gating and abating lead hazards, finding and treating lead
poisoned citizens, and educating children whose cognitive develop-
ment has been negatively affected by lead exposure.  The public
right, namely protection of public health, must be paid for by pub-
lic tax dollars.71  In determining whether there has been interfer-
ence, the court must determine whether the facts support a
finding that the defendants created or assisted in the creation of a
nuisance that caused or threatened to cause harm to the public
(1979) (noting that the interests protected by private nuisance actions are use and
enjoyment of land itself).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821B(1) (1979). Accord Am. Cyanamid, 823
N.E.2d at 130; Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. 99-5226, 2007 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 32 at *144 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007); City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore &
Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 118 (Mo. 2007); City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691
N.W.2d 888, 891 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (using the phrase “a condition or activity which
substantially or unduly interferes with the use of a public place or with the activities
of an entire community”).  California law, at issue in Santa Clara, is even broader.
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479-80 (West 2008).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821(B) cmt. g (1979).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants-Plaintiffs at 24, City of St. Louis v. Benjamin
Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2007) (No. SC88230).
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that the public ought not to have to bear.72  This element is closely
tied to the causation requirement discussed later.  In determining
whether the interference with public health is unreasonable, a
court generally looks at three areas, any of which alone may sup-
port a finding of unreasonableness:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with
the public health . . . safety . . . peace . . . comfort or . . . conve-
nience, or (b) whether the conduct is proscribed by statute . . . ,
or (c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has pro-
duced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor
knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the
public right.73
In the case of lead paint, plaintiffs must show that the effect on
public health from the lingering presence of lead paint rises to the
level of significant effect or that the defendant-manufacturers
knew or should have known that that their marketing and distri-
bution activities would create a permanent effect on public
health.74
C: Why the Government is Best Suited to Pursue a
Public Nuisance Claim
To meet the final requirement in asserting a claim in public
nuisance, the plaintiff must have a right to bring the action.  Orig-
inally, a public nuisance was a crime against the Crown, and the
Crown was responsible to prosecute offenders.75  Today, public
nuisance is still primarily a claim for the government, but where
the interference with a public right affects an individual in a spe-
cial and different way, she will have the right to sue in public nui-
sance.76  Absent such a special harm, the government is the only
party with the right to sue in public nuisance, and that right is
72. See Jury Instructions at 10-11, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc.,  No.
99-5226, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32, (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007). Accord, In re Lead
Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 511 (N.J. 2007); County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield
Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2) (1979).
74. Indeed, this was the position taken by all plaintiffs in the major cases dis-
cussed in Part III. See, e.g., Santa Clara., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 324-25, 324 n.4 (articu-
lating the plaintiff’s contention that defendant-manufacturers were aware of the
hazards presented by lead paint and actively promoted the product).
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. a (1979) (discussing the
state as the original public authority to bring a public nuisance action and the 16th
century development of a private right of action).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (1979).
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limited to a suit in its representative capacity.77  Given the uni-
form nature of the interference created by lead paint manufactur-
ers, and the relative failure of government entities to meet the
special harm requirement in the most agreeable circumstances
(California), to expect a private citizen to be able to show a special
harm sufficient to carry the burden in a public nuisance action
seems, at best, ineffective and, at worst, foolish.
Aside from legal obstacles to private plaintiffs, there are prac-
tical reasons why a government entity is better suited to bring a
public nuisance action.  Reliance on individual plaintiffs to seek
redress for conduct that interferes with a public right puts too
much pressure on the individual plaintiff to discover all the neces-
sary facts.  A public nuisance, by its nature, will affect the entire
community and that requires decades of historical data, popula-
tion-wide statistical information, and significant costs in finding
and joining all the relevant defendants.78  The government is best
suited to carry out these tasks.79
PART III: CHARTING THE ACTUAL CASES AND
WHY RHODE ISLAND GOT IT RIGHT
A: What Is A Nuisance?
In 1999, the State of Rhode Island filed suit against the Lead
Industries Association, and several paint manufacturers, includ-
ing Sherwin Williams Company, NL Industries, Inc. (formerly Na-
tional Lead Company), and Millennium Holdings, LLC.  After an
initial mistrial, the case ended in the first jury verdict in the coun-
try to find lead paint manufacturers liable, on a public nuisance
theory, to abate the hazard their products had caused to the State
77. In Santa Clara, the government plaintiffs sued both in a representative ca-
pacity and an individual capacity for damage to public buildings, but the court upheld
the defendants’ demurrer to the cause of action in an individual capacity because the
county was merely seeking “damages for injuries caused to plaintiffs’ property by a
product.” Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 331 (emphasis omitted).
78. In Rhode Island, defendants even requested site-specific discovery at up to
330,000 properties after having been allowed initially to take property specific evi-
dence at 114 properties. See Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., No. 99-5226,
2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 79, at *2-*3 (Super. Ct. May 18, 2005).
79. See Brief of Appellant-Plaintiffs at 31, City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore &
Co., 226 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2007) (No. SC88230); Economically speaking, an industry
has more to fear from the committed actions of several states than it does from the
action of a hundred individual plaintiffs.  Cf. Master Tobacco Settlement Agreement,
Nov. 23, 1998, available at http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-
pdf/1109185724_1032468605_cigmsa.pdf.
17
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of Rhode Island.80  The jury instructions articulate succinctly
Rhode Island law as determined by the court and deserve quota-
tion in full:
[Y]ou will be asked to decide whether each Defendant individu-
ally or whether more than one Defendant through collective con-
duct is or are responsible for creating, maintaining or
substantially contributing to the creation or maintenance of such
public nuisance in Rhode Island . . . .  A public nuisance is some-
thing that unreasonably interferes with a right common to the
general public; it is something that unreasonably interferes
with the health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the gen-
eral community.  An essential element of a public nuisance
claim is that persons have suffered harm or are threatened with
injuries that they ought not to have to bear.81
The court went on to define ‘an interference’ as “an injury,
invasion, disruption, or obstruction of a right held by the general
public.”82  In considering the unreasonableness of the interfer-
ence, the jury was instructed to “consider a number of factors in-
cluding the nature of the harm, the numbers of the community
who may be affected by it, the extent of the harm, the permanence
of the injuries and the potential for likely future injuries or
harm.”83  This interpretation is substantially similar to the rules
articulated in the Restatement and does not indicate some radical
departure unique to Rhode Island.84  The courts in American Cy-
anamid, Santa Clara, Milwaukee, New Jersey Consolidated Lead,
and St. Louis, are generally in agreement with the Restatement
(or offer a definition that is more accommodating from the plain-
tiff’s perspective) and therefore support the argument that public
nuisance could include lead paint hazards in housing stock.85
80. The case is currently before the court to approve the appointment of a special
master to oversee the implementation of the order to abate. See Rhode Island v. Lead
Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).  [Ed. note:
Since this was written, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s
order.  No special master will be appointed since the case has now been dismissed.
For more information, see infra Addendum at end.]
81. Jury Instructions at 10-11, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., No. 99-
5226 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).
82. Id. at 11.
83. Id. at 12.
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821A cmt. b, 821B cmt. e, g, i & 825
(1979).
85. City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 130 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005);
County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325-27 (Ct. App.
2006); City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 892 (finding that plain-
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The American Cyanamid court, after hinting that a public
right may not be at issue,86 chose to base its dismissal of the plain-
tiff’s public nuisance claim on a failure to show causation.  The
court relied heavily on an opinion by the Illinois Supreme Court in
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp87 issued two days after oral
arguments in American Cyanamid.  The American Cyanamid
court found that plaintiffs failed to allege causation in fact because
they failed to prove product identification.88  Despite acknowledg-
ing that the proper test in determining causation (the substantial
factor test) was fact-specific and a matter for the jury, the court
upheld the dismissal of the complaint, doing so without any cita-
tion or analysis.89  Instead, the court moved immediately to a dis-
cussion of market-share liability and the requisite causation proof
for that claim.  This is a clear example of the court mistaking the
issue.  The American Cyanamid court relied on the Beretta deci-
sion in asserting the need for product identification, but the Ber-
etta opinion makes no mention of product identification.  Rather,
the court there was concerned with the superceding acts of illegal
handgun purchasers.  As the Beretta court remarked and the
American Cyanamid court quoted: “legal cause will not be found
where the criminal acts of third parties have broken the causal
connection and the resulting nuisance is such as in the exercise of
reasonable diligence would not be anticipated and the third per-
son is not under the control of the one guilty of the original
wrong.”90  The analogy to lead paint cannot be maintained.  Hand-
gun manufacturers do not sell their product knowing that, when
used legally, the product will create a public health risk.  Lead
paint manufacturers, on the other hand, were well aware of the
toxic nature of the product and when selling it fully intended the
paint to be applied to walls.  There are no intervening criminal
tiff must prove harm to the public, that defendants were a substantial factor is caus-
ing the harm, and abatement was reasonable); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484,
511 (N.J. 2007); City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 116 (Mo.
2007).
86. The court made much of one commentator’s opinion that “public nuisance does
not appear to be broad enough to encompass the right of a child who is lead-poisoned
. . . in [a] private residence[ ],” but was forced to concede that “a different panel of this
court has stated that allegations substantially similar to those in the instant case
‘sufficiently alleged the violation of a public right.’” Am. Cyanamid, 823 N.E.2d at
132-33 (quoting Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)).
87. 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004).
88. Am. Cyanamid, 823 N.E.2d at 134.
89. Id. at 136.
90. Id. at 138 (quoting Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1099).
19
\\server05\productn\P\PER\26-1\PER106.txt unknown Seq: 20  2-MAR-09 9:10
244 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
acts in the application of lead paint.  Furthermore, the Beretta
court noted that the third person is not under the control of the
handgun manufacturers when she shoots the gun.  Thus, the man-
ufacturers cannot be said to have caused the injury.  Lead paint is
not an intervening person.  It causes injury by itself when used in
the manner anticipated by the manufacturers.
The American Cyanamid plaintiffs were also working against
an earlier legislative pronouncement that intact lead paint was
not a hazard.91  To account for this, plaintiffs argued that lead
paint is a public nuisance because it will inevitably deteriorate.92
The court was not persuaded by that argument but chose, instead,
to take issue with the causation element.  The court in New Jersey
Consolidated Lead dismissed the plaintiff’s public nuisance claims
as soon as it reached a perceived statutory limitation.93  The New
Jersey Supreme Court, in a split 4-2 decision, decided that New
Jersey’s Lead Paint Act (LPA) and the Product Liability Act (PLA)
effectively barred plaintiff’s public nuisance action because, rather
counter-intuitively, the legislature affirmatively declared lead
paint in homes a public nuisance94 and therefore, because land-
lords are regulated under the act, this bars plaintiffs from seeking
relief from the original manufacturer.95  Contrary to every other
court in the country to consider the issue, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court found that lead paint hazards are best pursued
under a products liability theory.96
The dissent, citing substantial case law, rightly pointed out
that the legislature cannot be deemed to have extinguished a com-
mon law right unless it expressly does so in the statute97 and
thus, the definition of nuisance under common law should be left
91. See Lead Poisoning Prevention Act, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/8(1)(E)
(West 2000).  The Act, however, deals only with inspection duties of the Department
of Health and requires an inspection report that, among other things, must “[s]tate
either that a lead hazard does exist or [not]. . . The existence of intact lead paint does
not alone constitute a lead hazard for the purposes of this Section.” Id. (emphasis
supplied).  This does not mean that lead paint might not still constitute a public
nuisance.
92. See Am. Cyanamid, 823 N.E.2d at 132.
93. See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d  484, 504-05 (N.J. 2007).
94. N.J. STAT. ANN. 24:14A-5 (West 2007).  The LPA directs local boards of health
to abate the nuisance and attaches liability for costs to property owners. Id. § A-8.
95. See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 501.
96. Id. at 503.  The court characterized lead paint as a consumer product, relief
from which would be actionable only under products liability, disregarding the
equally reasonable view that the widespread, inevitable deterioration of that lead
paint could also constitute a public nuisance. See id.
97. Id. at 508 (Zazzali, C.J. dissenting).
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to the courts.  The dissent observed further: “In fact, the [LPA]
does not even concern tort liability.  Rather, it is an enabling stat-
ute authorizing local health boards to enforce lead paint regula-
tions.”98  There is simply no language in the LPA that limits the
government’s public nuisance action, even if such a limitation
were allowed.  Much like the dissent in New Jersey Consolidated
Lead, the Rhode Island court found that Rhode Island’s Lead
Poisoning Prevention Act (LPPA) “does not preclude the State
from maintaining [a] public nuisance action.”99  Much like the
LPA in New Jersey, the LPPA in Rhode Island was “not intended
to ‘authorize’ the presence of lead paint [as defendants argued] or
otherwise insulate actors such as the Defendants from public nui-
sance liability.”100  Accordingly, the New Jersey Consolidated Lead
dissent would hold, and the Rhode Island court did hold, that stat-
utory directives to government health departments and landlords
do not preclude common law claims against lead paint
manufacturers.101
We see, then, that lead paint statutes should not, by them-
selves, define a nuisance for purposes of common law nor limit
manufacturer liability under a public nuisance theory and the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision to do so is simply bad law.
This position is supported by the fact that California,102 Mis-
souri,103 and Wisconsin104 all have similar lead poisoning preven-
tion laws and none refer to manufacturer liability or immunity,
public nuisance, or common law rights.  Nor did the courts in
Santa Clara, St. Louis, or Milwaukee even mention potential con-
flicts with these acts.  Defining lead paint hazards as a public nui-
sance, then, should not be a significant hurdle for plaintiff
98. Id. at 508.  The dissent goes further into the inherent inconsistency between
the majority’s characterization of the legislature’s broad sweeping effort to reduce
lead hazards and the conclusion that the legislature meant to subsume all nuisance
litigation over lead paint. Id.
99. Jury Instructions at 10, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., No. 99-5226,
2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).
100. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., No. 99-5226, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS
32, at *52 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).
101. The Appellate Court of Illinois in American Cyanamid, though it did not base
its decision on such, would be forced to come to the same conclusion with respect to
the Illinois equivalent of the LPA. See supra note 91.
102. See Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Act of 1991, ANN. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 105275 (West 2008).
103. See Lead Abatement and Prevention of Lead Poisoning 1998 Amendments,
MO. REV. STAT. § 701.300 (2008).
104. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 254.11 (West 2008).  Note that this is the same sub-
chapter dealing with asbestos and other toxic substances.
21
\\server05\productn\P\PER\26-1\PER106.txt unknown Seq: 22  2-MAR-09 9:10
246 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
governments.105  Rather, it is the element of causation that has
given government plaintiffs the most trouble in proving a public
nuisance claim.106
B: How to Prove Causation of a Public Nuisance
Disagreement among the courts in these cases occurs when
determining how a nuisance is caused and how that causation can
be linked to the defendant-manufacturers.  The critical distinction
this paper attempts to make is between causation of harm to indi-
vidual lead-poisoned citizens and causation of a public nuisance
that interferes with a public right.  As the Rhode Island court told
the jury: “You are not asked to decide whether each separate prop-
erty that may contain such lead pigment is by itself a public nui-
sance, but rather whether the cumulative presence of all such
pigment on properties throughout the State constitutes a single
public nuisance.”107  This essentially does away with the product
identification requirement present in negligence-type claims.  The
focus, instead, is on harm to the general public.  As the Milwaukee
court remarked: “Were it otherwise, the concept of public nuisance
would have no distinction from the theories underlying class ac-
tion litigation, which serves to provide individual remedies for
similar harms to large numbers of identifiable individuals.”108
Rather, the Milwaukee court found that the plaintiffs “must show
that defendants’ conduct or products were ‘substantial factors’ in
causing the injury.”109  In the words of the Santa Clara court,
105. Indeed, the jury in Milwaukee returned a 10-2 verdict finding that lead paint
in the City’s housing was a public nuisance.  It was on the second issue, whether the
defendants had unreasonably engaged in activity that caused the nuisance, that the
jury split 10-2 against the plaintiffs.  This information comes from a real-time blogger
who monitored the court proceedings. See Posting of Milwaukee v. NL – Now We
Know [Judge Rules Flawed Jury Verdict] to Law and More, http://lawandmore.type
pad.com/law_and_more/2007/06/page/4/ (June 22, 2007, 13:18 EST).
106. The court in Santa Clara similarly remarked: “Clearly [plaintiff’s] complaint
was adequate to allege the existence of a nuisance . . . The next question is whether
defendants could be held responsible.” County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40
Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325 (Ct. App. 2006).
107. Jury Instructions at 10, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No.  99-5226
(Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).  In an earlier decision on a motion for summary judgment,
the court stated specifically that the State did not have to “identify a particular paint
containing a lead pigment manufactured by any particular defendant at any particu-
lar location within the State.” Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., No. 99-5226,
2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 95, at *2 (June 3, 2005).
108. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2004).
109. Id.
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/6
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phrased in a more useful way: “the critical question is whether the
defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.”110
In essence, the defendants are on trial for causing the nuisance or
the injury that is the nuisance.  Plaintiffs are not required to
prove that each defendant caused injury to an individual person.
Bound up in the determination of the cause of a public nui-
sance is a subordinate issue often called ‘control of the instrumen-
tality.’  This issue arose in American Cyanamid, Santa Clara,
New Jersey Consolidated Lead, and Rhode Island.  In Rhode Is-
land, the defendants argued that they must have control over the
nuisance before they can be liable to abate it.  The court dismissed
this notion stating: “The Court has consistently rejected the pro-
position that control of specific property is required to find liabil-
ity, so long as it can be shown that the Defendants substantially
participated in the activities which caused the public nuisance,
and that public nuisance causes continuing harm.”111  This is the
crux of the paper.  The Rhode Island court’s interpretation is con-
sistent with the Restatement112 and consistent with other case law
outside the context of lead paint.113  The court in American Cyana-
mid cited the Restatement, but evidently stopped reading after the
phrase “carried on” because it stated: “Defendants here are not
carrying on or participating in carrying on anything”114 and thus
“plaintiff’s reliance on substantial participation as a substitute for
control misreads the Restatement.”115  Had the court continued a
bit further in the Restatement, it would have encountered the
phrase transcribed in note 112, which imposes liability “even
though he [who caused the nuisance] is no longer in a position to
110. Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325 (emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App.
4th Supp. 28, 38 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2004).
111. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., No. 99-5225, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS
32, at *148 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834, cmt. f (1979) (providing, “if the
activity has resulted in the creation of a physical condition which is, of itself, harmful
after the activity that created it has ceased, a person who carried on the activity
which [sic] created the condition or who participated to a substantial extent in such
activity is subject to liability [for a nuisance], for the continuing harm. . . . This is so
even though he is no longer in a position to abate the condition and to stop the harm.”)
(emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 556 N.W.2d 345, 351-52 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1996) (collecting cases in support of the notion that control of the property
has never been a requirement to finding liability in the one who originally caused the
nuisance).
114. City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
115. Id.
23
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abate the condition.”116  Without the support of the Restatement,
the American Cyanamid court is left with its reliance on Beretta.
That reliance is misplaced because, by its own words, the argu-
ment in Beretta was based on two elements: (1) that the alleged
harm resulted from the criminal acts of third parties, and (2) that
the conduct was too remote from the alleged injury for liability to
attach.117  These elements are absent from the lead paint context
because there are no intervening criminal acts and the lead paint
manufacturers knew of the toxic nature of the product and knew
that in its ordinary use it would mobilize and present a hazard.118
The court in Santa Clara, faced with a similar lack of control
argument, quickly dispatched with defendants’ argument that
they cannot be held liable for the public nuisance because they
lacked the ability to abate, instead finding that: “Liability for nui-
sance does not hinge on whether the defendant owns, possesses or
controls the property, nor on whether he is in a position to abate
the nuisance; the critical question is whether the defendant cre-
ated or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.”119  The dissenting
opinion in New Jersey Consolidated Lead quotes this same phrase,
as well as other case law, in opposition to the majority’s finding
that control of the property is a necessary prerequisite to finding
liability for the causation of a public nuisance.120  The majority in
New Jersey Consolidated Lead adopted a more restricted view of
public nuisance.  The majority would place blame on owners who
applied the lead paint because it is they, in accordance with the
Restatement, who have “engaged in the conduct that involves a
significant interference with the public health” not the manufac-
turers.121  This argument, again, fails to consider the difference
between public and private nuisance.  In a private nuisance,
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834, cmt. f (1979).
117. See Am. Cyanamid, 823 N.E.2d at 133.
118. The remaining issue, cause-in-fact, was for the jury to decide. See Chicago v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 281 N.E.2d 1099, 1132 (stating “[w]e are unwilling to state as a
matter of law that plaintiffs have failed to raise an issue of material fact with regard
to cause in fact”).
119. County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325 (Ct. App.
2006) (quoting Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 4th
Supp. 28, 38 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2004)).
120. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 510 (N.J. 2007) (Zazzali, C.J. dissenting)
(citing several federal cases, including a 1993 case from the District of New Jersey, in
which the courts “held that defendants are liable for abatement costs. . . even if the
defendant no longer has control over the property where the nuisance exists.”) (inter-
nal citations omitted).
121. Id. at 500-01 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (1979)).
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where an individual sues for damages caused by lead paint, the
owner of the particular house in which the plaintiff was exposed to
lead paint might bear a more direct responsibility for those inju-
ries than the original manufacturer.  In the context of a public
nuisance, however, the owner of the property becomes irrelevant
because the injury is the threatened harm to the public health.  To
be in control of that property would require ownership of the en-
tire political subdivision represented by the government plaintiff
and surely that cannot be the outcome implied by the section of
the Restatement quoted by the majority opinion.  Having articu-
lated the ill-founded finding that control of the property was rele-
vant, the majority went on to find that the absence of control
translates into an absence of causation.  How the majority makes
this leap is not clear.  The majority tried to buttress this finding
by referring to the LPA’s focus on landlords, but for reasons al-
ready stated the LPA should not apply to the government’s public
nuisance claim.
Aside from the effect of the LPA, the majority of the New
Jersey court held that the public nuisance action would have
failed even if “the continuing presence of lead paint in homes
qualifie[d] as an interference with a common right sufficient to
constitute a public nuisance for tort purposes.”122  To support this,
the court says only that “plaintiffs’ complaints aim wide of the lim-
its of [the public nuisance] theory.”123  The court then reasoned
that the true cause of the lead paint crisis was poor maintenance
by owners and that to ignore this, plaintiffs “would separate con-
duct and location and thus eliminate entirely the concept of con-
trol of the nuisance.”124  Aside from the legal error in making
control a requirement, this argument also fails to account for a
critical factual reality: even well-maintained houses still threaten
to harm public health because people, in the normal use of their
home, will abrade painted surfaces (whether opening a window,
closing a door, or renovating the kitchen) and mobilize the toxic
lead dust.125  Lead paint manufacturers were aware of this reality
and lobbied strenuously to keep this information from the
public.126
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 506 (Zazzali, C.J., dissenting).
126. It is this sense of injustice that animates the dissent’s conclusion: “The major-
ity’s holding unfairly places the cost of abatement on taxpayers and private property
owners, while sheltering those responsible for creating the problem.” Id. at 512.
25
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C: The Effect of the Remedy Sought
While not a central consideration when determining causa-
tion, the type of remedy sought by a government entity in a public
nuisance action perhaps has the starkest impact.  The St. Louis
case outlines the ramifications of remedy choice most succinctly.
In St. Louis, the city sued in public nuisance seeking reimburse-
ment for the costs of lead paint abatement.  Like in American Cy-
anamid, the St. Louis court, sitting in a jurisdiction that had
previously rejected Sindell market-share liability127, found that
market-share evidence could not be the sole evidence of causation.
Over a vigorous dissent, the St. Louis court held, 4 to 3, that the
product identification requirement announced in Zafft applied to
the city’s claim despite the city’s assertion that “the damage was
not an individual injury, but a widespread health hazard.”128  The
court observed that this was not the case:
The damages [the city] seeks are in the nature of a private tort
action for the costs the city allegedly incurred abating and
remediating lead paint in certain, albeit numerous properties.
In this way, the city’s claims are like those of any plaintiff seek-
ing particularized damages allegedly resulting from a public
nuisance.129
As the majority suggests: “The city’s argument, accepted by the
dissent,. . . does not apply to the damage suit [the city] has actu-
ally brought.”130  Implicitly, had the city argued only for an in-
junction to stop the nuisance, it would not have been seeking
particularized damages and so would not have to bother with site-
specific product identification.131
Compare to this outcome, the Rhode Island case.  After dis-
missing the state’s claims for indemnification, unjust enrichment,
and compensatory damages, the court allowed the public nuisance
claim, seeking only abatement, to go to the jury.  The state was
127. See Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
128. City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 116 (Mo. 2007).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. By contrast, the Santa Clara court merely noted that “[t]he remedy sought
was abatement from all public and private homes and property so affected” and never
had cause to consider a tension between remedies. See County of Santa Clara v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 324 (Ct. App. 2006).
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prohibited from presenting evidence on past damages.132  Accord-
ing to the Restatement:
(1) In order to recover damages in an individual action for a
public nuisance, one must have suffered [particularized harm].
(2) In order to maintain a proceeding to enjoin to abate a public
nuisance, one must
(a) have the right to recover damages, as indicated in Sub-
section (1), or
(b) have authority as a public official or public agency to re-
present the state or a political subdivision in the matter, or
(c) have standing to sue as a representative of the general
public, as a citizen in a citizen’s action or as a member of a
class in a class action.133
There is no requirement to show damages, and thus the causation
of those damages, when the state only seeks an injunction to abate
a public nuisance.  The court in Rhode Island expressly communi-
cated this difference, saying on one hand: “abatement means the
public nuisance is to be rendered harmless or suppressed . . . if you
decide that abatement shall take place, it will be for the Court to
determine the manner in which such abatement will be carried
out.”134  Separately, the court noted: “the jury never considered
damages during its deliberations.”135  This distinction has a sig-
nificant bearing on causation.  In the first instance, where an en-
tity seeks damages, the injury has already occurred and should, at
the time of trial, be quantifiable.  Such quantification would in-
clude the particular source or cause of that individual injury.
However, if the relief sought is abatement of a nuisance, the in-
jury is by its very nature unquantifiable because relief is sought
as a preventive measure.  To be sure, evidence of past injury may
be relevant to prove that the nuisance is unreasonable or an inter-
ference, but it should not complicate a simple showing that defen-
dant-manufacturers substantially contributed to the creation of
the nuisance itself.
132. See Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., No. 99-5226, 2007 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 32, at *6 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1979) (emphasis added).
134. Jury Instructions at 16, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No.  99-5226, 2007
R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).
135. Rhode Island, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 at *100.
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In perhaps the most glaring misconstruction of the public nui-
sance theory, the court in American Cyanamid, discussing the na-
ture of the remedy sought, remarked: “Defendants argue that
plaintiff cannot escape the requirement of showing causation in
fact by stylizing a products liability claim as a public nuisance ac-
tion.”136  Admittedly, this is a paraphrasing of the defendants’ po-
sition, yet the court does not reject nor correct it.  Rather it builds
on the premise, essentially accepting the assertion that plaintiff’s
‘real’ claim is actually in products liability.  Moreover, the plain-
tiffs are not seeking to escape any causation requirement, rather
they argue that they are “not seeking to recover for an injury to a
particular person or property but, instead [are] asserting the right
of the public as a whole to be free from threats to its health and
safety.”137  How a threat to public safety can be conceived of in
terms of money damages is unclear.  The New Jersey Consolidated
Lead court took a more reasoned approach noting: “the complaints
seek damages rather than remedies of abatement . . . .  Plaintiffs
. . . cannot identify any special injury.”138  As indicated in section
821C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, absent a showing of
special or particularized injury, the state cannot maintain such an
action.139
Wisconsin, evidently, follows a more liberal rule.  As the court
observed with approval in Milwaukee: “The City asks that defend-
ants pay the costs associated with the City’s abatement program.
Specifically, the suit seeks: (1) compensatory and equitable relief
for abatement of the toxic lead hazards . . . (2) restitution . . . and
(3) punitive damages.”140  The court also quoted from a 1929 Wis-
consin Supreme Court case, Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry.
Co., which held: “The damage that may be recovered in actions
based upon nuisance must always be the natural and proximate
consequence of the danger created by the nuisance.”141  The court
there made no distinction between public and private nuisance,
136. City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 135 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
137. Id.
138. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 502-03 (N.J. 2007).
139. Ironically, the court in New Jersey Consolidated Lead found that all the inju-
ries plaintiffs identified were general to the public at large, a finding that any other
plaintiff would be thrilled to have. Id. at 503.  Here, however, because of the per-
ceived conflict with the abatement requirements in the LPA, this finding works
against the plaintiffs. Id. at 502.
140. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2004).
141. Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry. Co., 224 N.W. 748, on reargument, 227
N.W. 385, 386 (Wis. 1929).
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but seemed to allow for recovery of damages under either theory.
Imbedded in this reference to an early twentieth century case,
however, is a distinction that bears heavily on the central issue in
this paper.  The court in Brown spoke of the danger created by the
nuisance and not the activity of the defendants.  Expounding on
this idea is the function of the next section.
PART IV: WHERE CONDUCT YIELDS TO DANGER
In thinking about the difference between conduct and danger,
and how that distinction affects proof of causation of a public nui-
sance, several terms must be distinguished.  Consider the word
‘harm’.  In some instances, harm might refer to the injury actually
sustained by an individual from contact with a toxic product.  In
such an example, the individual sustains damages and might seek
to recover from whomever is responsible for the presence of the
toxic product.  Alternatively, ‘harm’ could refer to the threat of a
condition that may affect a public right, as when a toxic substance
is dumped on a public beach.  Here, no one sustains a personal
injury, but there is still harm to the public right.  Harm, then,
does not always require a demonstrated injury.  Consider the
word ‘cause’.  Take the broad example of flagging investor confi-
dence that in turn causes the stock market to decline, yet no single
devaluation of stock can be traced to the actions of a single inves-
tor.  The term ‘cause’ is used, but we understand it to mean ‘led
directly to an outcome’ because it is the condition to which inves-
tors contribute (through their lack of confidence) that we blame
for the subsequent turn of events.  It is not the individual actions
of a single investor that concerns us.
Applied to the case of lead paint, these terms are equally mu-
table.  However, by drawing a critical distinction, part of the judi-
cial confusion surrounding public nuisance might be explained.
Conceptually, the causation element in public nuisance must be
bifurcated so that each plaintiff actually has two steps to prove:
(1) that each defendant-manufacturer engaged in activities that
were a substantial cause of the public nuisance, and (2) that the
nuisance itself was a substantial factor in causing harm, whether
actual or threatened, to the public.  Viewed in this fashion, it is
easier to see why each government plaintiff considers public nui-
sance a viable argument.  Evidence introduced to show the first
part need not be the same evidence introduced to prove the sec-
ond.  For instance, the state could submit market share data to
demonstrate that each manufacturer operating in the jurisdiction
29
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affirmatively engaged in conduct that was a substantial cause of
the distribution and application of lead paint.  This would not
raise the specter of market-share liability because damages are
not being sought for any particular injury and so fair apportion-
ment (the basis for Sindell-type departure from negligence princi-
ples) is not yet an issue.  The state could then offer evidence that
lead paint is a substantial factor is causing a public health risk.
In the Milwaukee case, the court carefully articulated the po-
sition of the plaintiffs, namely:
[D]efendants are responsible for [abatement costs] because their
conduct in marketing and selling substantial quantities of lead
[paint] in the City of Milwaukee and after the construction of
these dwellings, when they knew the hazards of lead poisoning
related to their product, was a substantial factor creating the
public nuisance.142
This quotation is perhaps most important for what it does not
say.  The plaintiffs in Milwaukee did not claim (and the court did
not require them to prove) that the defendants were responsible
for the lead paint hazard on the walls of houses in Milwaukee,
rather the city focused on the defendants’ individual and collective
conduct in the marketing and selling of lead paint.  Absent this
marketing and selling, lead paint would not have entered Milwau-
kee and would never have been applied to walls there.  The mar-
keting and distribution was the conduct creating the nuisance.
The court in Santa Clara encountered similarly targeted allega-
tions that claimed defendants were “liable in public nuisance in
that they created . . . contributed to . . . or assisted in the creation
. . . or were a substantial contributing factor in the creation of the
public nuisance by engaging in a massive campaigning to promote
the use of Lead . . . .”143  Again, the defendants were not accused of
causing injury to anyone by causing harmful contact between an
individual lead product and an individual person.  Rather, the
plaintiffs, and the courts in both cases, were focused on the danger
created by the defendants.  Where the danger was sufficient to
constitute a public nuisance, the court then turned separately to
the effect of that nuisance on the public right.  This was precisely
the approach that the court in Rhode Island instructed the jury to
142. Milwaukee, 691 N.W.2d at 890-91.
143. County of Santa Clara v. Atl., Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 324 (Ct.
App. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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take.144  In the end, that jury returned a unanimous verdict for
the state.  Had the courts in American Cyanamid, New Jersey
Consolidated Lead, and St. Louis been handed similarly straight-
forward guidance, perhaps the outcomes would have been in keep-
ing with the principles underlying public nuisance.
To give all of these observations practical meaning, we must
return to the underlying principles at stake in each of the central
cases.  Public nuisance, as a common law theory, is admittedly
broad.  But that is its charm.  It is designed to relieve the unfairly
burdened public from an interference it ought not to have to bear.
It is designed to be used when all other theories fail.  No one seri-
ously disputes the premise that lead paint presents a hazard to
the public.  The operative question, rather, is who can fairly be
held liable?  Making that determination is the province of the jury
and, as we have seen in both Wisconsin and Rhode Island, it can
be difficult.145  It is imperative, therefore, that plaintiff-govern-
ments ensure clarity of the issues to minimize the distraction
often created by defendants’ misplaced negligence-type argu-
ments.  Plaintiffs must be more nimble in the public relations
game by taking every opportunity to reframe the issues, always
returning to the notion that a lead-free housing stock is a right
and companies that profited from the sale of a toxin should pay
their fair share to fix the problem.  To get to a jury, however, the
plaintiff must plead a cause of action that can survive summary
judgment.  Public nuisance is that cause of action.  What happens
once the jury is sworn in is very far beyond the scope of this paper.
Addendum:
On July 1, 2008, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued a
decision reversing the Superior Court’s ruling on lead-paint man-
ufacturers’ earlier motion to dismiss.146  The Supreme Court held
unanimously that the trial justice had misapplied the law of pub-
lic nuisance by finding a causal connection between defendant
manufacturers’ acts and the subsequent lead poisoning of Rhode
Island’s children.  Although it framed the problem in terms of cau-
144. See Jury Instructions at 12, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., No. 99-
5226, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 32 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2007).
145. Recall that the jury in Milwaukee was split on both questions (existence of a
nuisance and liability for that nuisance) and that the Rhode Island case went through
one mistrial and a deadlocked jury before a unanimous verdict for the plaintiff was
reached. See Marie Rohde, Lead Paint Suit Fails, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 22,
2007, available at http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=623662.
146. See Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I. 2008).
31
\\server05\productn\P\PER\26-1\PER106.txt unknown Seq: 32  2-MAR-09 9:10
256 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
sation, the court actually addressed issues not related to causa-
tion, per se, but rather to policy limitations and other legal
guidelines that govern the application of the public nuisance doc-
trine.  With respect to the issues the court did address, it did not
apply the common law of nuisance accurately.
While the Rhode Island Supreme Court mentioned the trial
court’s failure to respect the separation of powers and failure to
observe the dictates of the Rhode Island General Assembly, its ul-
timate legal analysis focused on two issues: (1) whether freedom
from lead paint hazards in the state’s housing stock was a public
right, and (2) whether liability would attach where defendants did
not have control of the pigment at the time of injury.  The court
held that plaintiffs had failed to allege a public right and defend-
ants could not be liable unless that had control of the pigment at
all times.147  However, the court overstepped its role on the first
issue and misapplied the law of public nuisance on the second
issue.
The right to be free from lead paint hazards has not been codi-
fied as a public right in Rhode Island law, nor has it been an-
nounced in any prior State Supreme Court decisions.  But then,
public rights are not enumerated exhaustively anywhere, so the
fact that it hasn’t been ruled on in Rhode Island before should not
preclude finding so here.  The court’s opinion identifies several
rights that are commonly recognized as public: air, water, rights of
way.148  The court states that “[t]he term public right is reserved
more appropriately for those indivisible resources shared by the
public at large” and then concludes that the housing stock of the
State of Rhode Island is not an indivisible resource.149  While this
may be a rational conclusion to reach, it does not say anything
about the causal link between a nuisance and a defendant’s con-
duct (the focus of this article).150  In identifying what rights are
147. Id. at 443.
148. Id. at 453.
149. Id.
150. It is unclear how the court defined indivisible.  Housing has surely become a
resource that governments make great efforts to preserve, expand and make afforda-
ble by grants, loans and legislation.  Public housing, in particular, is available to the
“public at large” although not everyone could be accommodated at once.  Indivisible
use (or use en masse) of a resource cannot be the test for determining a public right.
Rather, the potential for interference with anyone’s right, available because they are a
member of the public, must be the appropriate test.  “The public” is nothing more than
the citizenry, thus potential interference with anyone who would temporarily use
public housing, for example, should be sufficient to create interference with a shared,
indivisible resource like housing.  After all, the court considers water an indivisible
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public in nature, courts tend to rely on policy determinations.
Here, the court refuses to honor the jury’s determination that in-
terference with a public right had occurred because they feared
the “widespread expansion of public nuisance law that never was
intended.”151  While such a determination is certainly within an
individual court’s purview to make, it does not follow that the lim-
itation is somehow imbedded in public nuisance law.152  Tellingly,
the court does not cite a single Rhode Island case, but instead re-
lies heavily on Chicago v. Beretta,153 an Illinois handgun case, and
the assertion of one commentator.154  The reliance on Beretta is
misplaced, however, as another Illinois panel, the American Cyan-
amid court, makes clear.  An Illinois court has already held that
plaintiffs bringing a public nuisance action against lead paint
manufacturers “sufficiently alleg[e] the violation of a public right”
where:
the plaintiffs . . . asser[t] that the defendants promoted, manu-
factured, sold, and distributed lead pigment for use in paints to
be used on residential interior surfaces and that such paint ex-
posed all children in this state to the risk of lead poisoning.155
The Rhode Island Attorney General filed an identical pleading.
As such, the jury’s implicit determination, that there was a public
right with which defendants had interfered, should not have been
disturbed.
The second issue on which the Rhode Island Supreme Court
hung its hat was the “requirement” of control of the instrumental-
ity.  In order to prove a public nuisance, the court said, the state
“would have had to assert that defendants not only manufactured
the lead pigment but also controlled that pigment at the time it
caused injury to children in Rhode Island.”156  The court then
resource even though it can be temporary owned (as with temporary ownership of a
house) and that does not preclude finding a public nuisance if it is polluted or altered.
151. Id.
152. In contrast to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the court in Santa Clara
found no such limitation, stating: “[Plaintiffs] alleged that lead causes grave harm, is
injurious to health, and interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of life and prop-
erty. Clearly their complaint was adequate to allege the existence of a public nuisance
for which these entities, acting as the People, could seek abatement.” County of Santa
Clara v. At. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325 (Ct. App. 2006).
153. 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004)
154. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 454 (R.I. 2008).
155. Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 878 (Ill. 2003); See also supra
note 85.
156. Rhode Island, 951 A.2d at 455.
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cited New Jersey Consolidated Lead for the general proposition
that upholding the case would “stretch the concept of public nui-
sance far beyond recognition.”157  Aside from the fact that the New
Jersey court did not base its decision on the “control” issue, the
Rhode Island court also fails to find language that is specifically
supportive of its narrow assertion that control of the lead paint at
the time of injury is a universally accepted principle.158  As dis-
cussed earlier, both the Restatement (Second) of Torts and general
public nuisance case law recognize that control of the property or
instrumentality is not a requirement in demonstrating a public
nuisance.  Rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defend-
ants substantially contributed to the creation of the nuisance.159
Had the Rhode Island Supreme Court given more consideration to
the nuanced history of the public nuisance action and dug deeper
into the cases it was citing, the outcome may have been different.
In any event, the central thrust of this article, that causation
should not prohibit the application of the public nuisance doctrine
to lead paint remediation cases, I believe, remains undisturbed.
157. Id.
158. On the issue of control, the court in New Jersey Consolidated Lead stated: “a
public nuisance, by definition, is related to conduct, performed in a location within the
actor’s control, which has an adverse effect on a common right.” In re Lead Paint
Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 499 (N.J. 2007).  This does not say that defendants must have
control over individual houses in order to abate lead hazards.  Rather, this language
addresses the need to identify a causal link between the defendants’ conduct and the
place where they performed that conduct.  In the case of lead paint, the defendants
controlled their factories, their distribution systems, and the marketing tools that
caused lead-based paint to reach Rhode Island’s housing stock.  There is no require-
ment stated by the New Jersey court that the control must overlap temporally with
the injury to children. Id. at 510 (Zazzali, C.J. dissenting) citing N.J. Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot. & Energy v. Gloucester Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., 821 F.Supp. 999, 1012
(D.N.J.1993) (“It is enough for a nuisance claim to stand that the defendants allegedly
contributed to the creation of a situation which, it is alleged, unreasonably interfered
with a right common to the general public.”); Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738
F.Supp. 623, 633 (D.R.I.1990) (“This court has discovered no state precedent that bars
recovery of nuisance damages simply because the defendants no longer control the
instrumentality.”); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F.Supp. 1219, 1222
(D.Mass.1986) (holding defendants liable even though they did not control nuisance);
County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 306, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d
313 (2006) ( “Liability for nuisance does not hinge on whether the defendant owns,
possesses or controls the property”) (internal punctuation omitted).
159. See Santa Clara, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that liabil-
ity for nuisance does not hinge on whether the defendant owns, possesses or controls
the property, nor on whether he is in a position to abate the nuisance); see also supra
notes 111 & 112.
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